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EU LAW AND GENDER-BALANCED BOARDS: MAKING 
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Snježana Vasiljević* and Ana-Maria Sunko**
Summary: This paper reflects on the problem of gender balance in 
economic decision-making, considers its legislative roots, and offers 
potential guidance for its solution. The paper takes into account the 
origin of positive action and effective equality in the scope of EU leg-
islation and CJEU case law and tackles the most troublesome issues 
regarding the new initiative of making equality in boards effective. 
It analyses gender equality in three approaches of positive action. 
Firstly, the fragile approach at the EU level, despite the rich historical 
impact it has had. Secondly, positive action on CJEU terrain where 
standards of equality have been set by useful case law. Finally, the 
form of legislative positive action which aimed to break the glass ceil-
ing in corporate boards – the ‘Women on Boards Directive’. With such 
an approach, the paper offers the authors’ view on the stability of 
positive action and an interpretation of the above-mentioned directive.
1 Introduction 
At the level of the EU there has been a rich history of regulating gen-
der equality issues since 1957, which means that the EU has been work-
ing on promoting gender equality for 60 years. Thus, the EU sets an ex-
ample for the affirmation of equal opportunities for all governing relations 
between men and women. Promoting gender equality is a core activity of 
the EU: equality between women and men is a fundamental EU value 
(article 2 TEU), an EU objective (article 3 TEU) and a driver of economic 
growth.1 At the beginning, EU equality legislation focused only on labour 
relations. There was no gender equality legislation outside the workplace. 
Over the years, the EU has developed an advanced equality framework, 
but the issue of economic decision-making has remained unmentioned. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that despite rich gender equal-
ity legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
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1 Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Strategy for equality 
between women and men 2010-2015’ COM (2010) 491 final.
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Union (CJEU) on positive action in the framework of gender equality, in 
the current EU legal framework there is a lack of legislative measures 
necessary to improve the position of women in decision-making. The au-
thors analyse the scope of EU gender equality legislation and case law 
on positive action and suggest that the proposed directive on improv-
ing the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies (the 
Women on Boards Directive) fulfils the requirements of the CJEU’s case 
law on positive action and should be adopted in order to achieve gender-
balanced boards.
The second part of the paper deals with the EU’s perspective on 
‘fragile’ positive action which will show that the EU has created rich pri-
mary and secondary gender equality law. Over the years, the European 
Union has produced several non-binding measures aimed at improving 
the participation of women in decision-making.2 However, these (non-
binding) recommendations have not led to any palpable progress. Obliga-
tory, or binding, legislation is also unsuitable and does not cover all the 
areas of interest in the field of gender balance. 
The third part of the paper discusses positive action on the CJEU’s 
terrain. A significant role in gender equality has been played by the Court. 
During its long work and rich legal history and guidance, the CJEU has 
made a legal basis in the sphere of case law for women in economic de-
cision-making. The CJEU case law on positive action is limited to gender 
and draws its legal basis from the first equality Directive 76/207/EEC. 
The CJEU ‘has established criteria that need to be met in order to recon-
cile the two concepts of formal equality of treatment and positive action 
aimed at bringing about de facto equality (by promoting the under-rep-
resented sex)’.3 How far the national courts have actually implemented 
the ‘guidelines’ put in practice by the CJEU is an area that has generally 
been inadequately investigated.
Moreover, because of the constant problem of gender inequality in 
economic decision-making (the number of women drops at every stage of 
executive careers4 despite the fact that 60% of graduates are female5) and 
given the lack of legislation to regulate this issue, the authors claim that a 
2 Such as: Commission (n 1).
3 Commission, ‘Women on Boards – Factsheet 3: Legal Aspects’ <http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/factsheet-general-3_en.pdf> accessed 3 
January 2018.
4 R Hosie, ‘Women Are Better Leaders Than Men, Study of 3,000 Managers Concludes’ Inde-
pendent, (London, 30 March 2017) < www.independent.co.uk/life-style/women-better-lead-
ers-men-study-a7658781.html?utm_content=buffera0161&utm_medium=social&utm_
source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer > accessed 3 January 2018.
5 Commission, ‘Gender Balance on Corporate Boards: Europe Is Cracking the Glass Ceil-
ing’ (Fact Sheet, July 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenon-
boards/factsheet_women_on_boards_web_2015-10_en.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018.
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directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors 
of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures is highly 
needed. The purpose of the proposal for such a directive was very ap-
propriate to ensure an equal number of women on boards. Its target was 
to set a quota of 40% of women on boards in publicly listed companies. 
This was a way of breaking the glass ceiling and the circle of man pow-
er at the top of decision-making. However, because the Member States 
were not able to reach an agreement, the proposal did not come to life. 
The proposal had set goals and procedural obligations for Member States 
which could have led to goals promoted in its scope. Nevertheless, the 
proposal is often criticised for sanctions which were not rigorous enough 
to actually ensure gender-balanced boards. ‘It does not impose an obliga-
tion to guarantee a certain result, but an obligation to put in one’s best 
efforts to take the necessary measures that can contribute to achieving 
the objective.’6 Other questions which arise here concern soft and hard 
law as a positive instrument, and where precisely the directive stands in 
this sense. Can the directive be considered as hard law given its really 
weak obligations? By analysing the substantive target and subject of the 
proposal, one must ask if it goes far enough and why it merely mentions 
non-executive boards. Finally, after tackling all these questions, the au-
thors can answer the most important one, which is the way the proposal 
for the directive fulfils the requirements of the CJEU case law on positive 
action, or whether it even has to fulfil them.
This paper shows that the proposal for the directive combines the 
requirements of the CJEU case law on positive action and that it should 
be adopted in order to achieve gender-balanced boards.
2 The EU ‘perspective’ for ‘fragile’ positive action
The term ‘positive measures’ (or positive action) refers to action 
aimed at favouring access by members of certain categories of people, 
in this particular case, women, to rights which they are guaranteed, 
to the same extent as members of other categories, in this particular 
case, men.7 ‘Nevertheless, confusion often surrounds exactly what type 
of measures fall under the concept of positive action.’8 There are several 
6 LAJ Senden and  M Visser, ‘Balancing a Tightrope: The EU Directive on Improv-
ing the Gender Balance among Non-executive Directors of Boards of Listed Compa-
nies’  (2013) 1 European Gender Equality Law Review < http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bit-
stream/handle/1874/287052/Senden+-+Balancing+a+Tightrope+-+The+EU+Directive.
pdf?sequence=1> accessed 3 January 2018.
7 Council of Europe, ‘Positive Action in the Field of Equality between Women and Men’ (Fi-
nal Report of the Group of Specialists on Positive Action between Women and Men, EG-SPA 
2000). 
8 L Waddington and M Bell, ‘Exploring the Boundaries of Positive Action under EU Law: A 
Search for Conceptual Clarity (2011) 48(5) CML Rev 1503.
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types of measures which are considered positive action, and they are: an-
tidiscrimination support measures, outreach measures, redefining merit, 
indirect and direct preferences.9 Positive action falls within the scope of 
EU competences because of the Treaties and their strong support in this 
regard. For example, article 2 TEU considers sex equality as one of the 
social values of fundamental importance common to all Member States.10 
Further, article 3 says that the EU must work against social exclusion 
and discrimination to promote equality between sexes within its market. 
In the scope of the TFEU, article 8 gives explicit instructions to the Union 
to act in a way which will eliminate inequalities and promote equality be-
tween men and women.11 Article 10 provides that the EU will implement 
policies and activities in order to defeat discrimination based on sex. Fi-
nally, article 157(3) TFEU, which is a basis of EU competence to deal with 
gender equality issues, was the strongest support for EU competence in 
the scope of positive action. This article explicitly provides the EU with 
the power to enact legislative measures to achieve equal opportunities 
and equal treatment of both sexes in matters of employment: 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, shall adopt measures to ensure the 
application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treat-
ment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, 
including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal 
value. 
Consequently, this article was considered part of the legal back-
ground for the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive 
directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures.12
A great majority of EU Member States regulate positive action in 
their equality/antidiscrimination legislation (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany Ireland, Island, Italy, Liech-
tenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, 
Slovenia, UK). Some of them, such as France, regulate positive action in 
their labour code.13
9 C McCrudden, ‘Rethinking Positive Action’ (1986) 15(1) Industrial Law Journal.
10 Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13. 
11 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/1. 
12 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges and related measures COM (2012) 0614 final – (2012) 0299 (COD).
13 G Selanec and L Senden, ‘Positive Action Measures to Ensure Full Equality in Practice 
between Men and Women including on Company Boards (European Commission, European 
Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality, 2011) 16. 
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Many of these States were clearly influenced by the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Violence against Women (CEDAW). 
States have a negative obligation to refrain from inequality and a posi-
tive obligation to promote de facto equality. Article 4(1) CEDAW explicitly 
provides that the adoption of temporary special measures aimed at ac-
celerating de facto equality between men and women should not been 
considered discrimination. Article 4(1) does not in itself impose a duty on 
States to adopt and apply temporary special measures. Rather, it makes 
clear that if a State does take such measures, and if these measures fall 
within the terms of this provision, there can (by definition) be no com-
plaint of discrimination. Thus, article 4(1) is an application instead of an 
exception to the definition of discrimination. Temporary special measures 
aim to remedy the effects of past or present discrimination against wom-
en and offer equal starting points or equal opportunities for women to ac-
celerate the process of equal participation of women in all fields of social, 
economic, political and cultural life and/or the process of redistribution 
of power and resources and the bringing about of social and cultural 
change that will improve the de facto position of women and to neutralise 
the advantages that men have in the existing social, economic, political 
and cultural systems.14
However, the EU is one of the major actors in promoting gender 
equality. European primary and secondary law promotes principles of 
equality and non-discrimination. The origins of the EU women’s policy lie 
in article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. Adopted in 1957, this article obliges 
Member States ‘to ensure the application of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work’.15 In an analysis of European provisions and definitions on 
positive action it is necessary to mention that the Treaty of Amsterdam 
explicitly includes equality between women and men among the objec-
tives of the EU. ‘Positive action’ was defined in 1976 in the context of 
British race relations, and was recommended in 1984 by the Council of 
Ministers of the then European Communities for improving the occupa-
tional position of women throughout the EC. Then it was incorporated 
into the Treaty of Amsterdam and into the directives of 2000.16 The adop-
tion of article 13 is a reflection of the growing recognition of the need to 
develop a coherent and integrated approach to combating discrimination. 
14 I Boerefijn and others (eds), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating de facto Equality 
of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (Intersentia 2003) 216.
15 C Hoskyns, ‘The European Union and the Women Within: An Overview of Women’s 
Rights Policy’ in RA Elman (ed), Sexual Politics and the European Union: The New Feminist 
Challenge (Berghahn Books 1996) 14. 
16 Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22; Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.
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It allows for common legal and political approaches that include various 
bases, and also includes a unique definition of discrimination. This late 
development of general anti-discrimination legislation and the late imple-
mentation of the directives in the Member States led to the lack of anti-
discrimination cases on discrimination on grounds other than sex before 
both national courts and the CJEU. In the mid-1990s consensus was 
reached to regulate other forms of discrimination in the European Union. 
The Amsterdam Treaty reinforces the existing provisions on the protec-
tion of human rights in the EU Treaty (articles 6 and 7), introducing a set 
of principles on which the Union is based (‘liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’), giving the 
CJEU powers to guarantee respect of these principles by the European 
institutions, and providing for sanctions in the event of a violation of the 
fundamental principles by a Member State. 
A significant body of EU law defines positive action. Since 2000, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights17 has been an essential element of Eu-
ropean anti-discrimination law. The Charter embodies the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination and defines positive action measures. 
It sets out the principle of gender equality in all areas and positive ac-
tion is provided for in this regard in article 23 of the Charter: ‘Equality 
between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including em-
ployment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the 
maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages 
in favour of the under-represented sex’.18
Article 157(4) TFEU prescribes the following: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and 
women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures 
providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the 
underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.
The secondary law of the EU also recognises and defines positive ac-
tion. Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207/EC19 stipulates that ‘this Directive 
17 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1. 
18 The adoption of the Charter was the result of a long-term process of implementing the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence on the role that fundamental rights have in the European legal order. 
It had already found in 1969 that fundamental human rights were ‘embedded in the general 
principles of Community law’ and, as such, the Court itself provides protection. The pro-
tection of fundamental rights is left to the Court, which developed a list of rights, drawing 
inspiration from the general principles of Community law and the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States.
19 Directive 76/207/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and work-
ing conditions [1976] OJ L39/40. 
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shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for 
men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which 
affect women’s opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)’. Arti-
cle 3 of the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC2020 on equal treatment for men 
and women in employment declares that ‘Member States may maintain 
or adopt measures within the meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with 
a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in 
working life’.
With such an approach, the above-mentioned legislation provides 
enough space for the Member States to lay down specific measures in 
national legislation to give more opportunities to women who are in most 
cases under-represented in the workplace. Although EU legislation, 
guidelines, actions and funding possibilities have contributed to a cer-
tain degree of convergence, progress has been uneven in many respects: 
In the countries with the highest unemployment rates, women’s rate 
was even wider than men’s rate: it reached 27.2% versus 18.9% for 
men in Greece, 20.7% versus 17.4% in Spain, 13.6% versus 12.5% 
in Cyprus, 12.2% versus 9.8% in Croatia, 12% versus 10.2% in Italy 
and 10.8% versus 10.5% in Portugal.21 
Data on the gender pay gap are only available for 2015 and show 
that the pay gap stood at 16.3% in 2014 while in 2010 it was 16.4%.22 
Data from October 2016 show that women still account for less than one 
in four (23.9%) board members in the largest publicly listed companies 
registered in EU Member States. Indeed, there are only four countries — 
France, Italy, Finland and Sweden, — where boards of large companies 
have at least 30% women.23
At the normative level, positive action measures fall within the scope 
of EU (the Marschall-Badec-Abrahamson doctrine) competences (articles 
2 and 3(3) TEU, articles 8, 10, 19, 157(3), 157(4) and 352 TFEU, and 
article 23 CFREU). A significant number of States have incorporated a 
positive action provision similar to article 157(4) TFEU into their legal or-
der and they have also extended its scope beyond employment. Member 
States complement their own legislation on gender equality in the light 
of the Directive on equal treatment 2002/73/EC24 and at the same time 
20 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities 
and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) 
[2006] OJ L 204/23. 
21  Commission, ‘2017 Report on Equality between Men and Women in the EU’ (2017) 11.
22  ibid 20. 
23  ibid 28. 
24  Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of 
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work on the transposition of the Racial Equality Directive and the Em-
ployment Equality Directive in their own legislation. In several cases, this 
has led to the adoption of comprehensive national laws covering discrimi-
nation on grounds of sex in parallel with the lessons learned from the 
foundations of discrimination. Apart from them (76/207/EC, 2002/73/
EC, 75/117/EC, 86/378/EC, 96/97/EC, 97/80/EC), there are several 
other directives relating to the principle of the application of equal treat-
ment in the field of labour and employment, social security, protection of 
pregnancy and motherhood and the burden of proof. Article 7 of Directive 
2000/78/EC defines positive action: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of 
equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintain-
ing or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for dis-
advantages linked to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1. 
The recent Directive 2006/54/EC (Recast Directive) which covers 
these areas in a single legislative framework relates to the application 
of the principle of equal opportunities and the principle of equal treat-
ment in employment and labour relations. Moreover, the Recast Directive 
shows that the positive action concept is very important in European law. 
The position of positive action is strengthened by tying article 3 of the Re-
cast Directive with article 157(4) TFEU. Directive 2004/113 (Goods and 
Services)25 also includes a positive action provision. Article 6 of the Goods 
and Services Directive states that ‘with a view to ensuring full equality 
in practice between men and women, the principle of equal treatment 
shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting spe-
cific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to sex’. 
The Race and General Framework Directives and the Gender Goods and 
Services Directive lay down that the principle of equal treatment ‘shall 
not prevent’ positive action measures. The Recast Directive states that 
‘Member States may maintain or adopt measures’. 
Most Member States have introduced provisions on positive action 
in regulations that promote the principle of equal opportunities, but in 
practice different States and their national legal orders perceive positive 
action in different ways.26 However, there is an absence of women in deci-
sion-making institutions in the political arena, on management boards of 
public and private companies, and in education. For instance, only 3% of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training 
and promotion, and working conditions [2002]  OJ L269/15.
25 Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treat-
ment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ 
L 373/37.
26 Selanec and Senden (n 13) 6.
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the largest publicly quoted companies have a woman chairing the high-
est decision-making body,27 although 60% of graduates are female.28 ‘The 
underrepresentation of women in the leadership positions constitutes an 
untapped potential source of highly qualified human resources and evi-
denced by the discrepancy between the high number of female graduates 
and their absence from top-level positions’.29 Exclusion from the labour 
market obviously shows that European equality legislation needs positive 
action enforcement.  Positive action measures can be used for different 
normative goals, e.g. to increase the number of the under-represented 
sex in politics and management boards, and to enable women and other 
disadvantaged groups to enter the labour market, education and oth-
er areas. In order to successfully implement positive action measures, 
Member States must put in place active implementation mechanisms.30
3 Positive action on the CJEU’s terrain 
EU positive action case law primarily concerns gender. Other 
grounds were added much later. The case law of the CJEU has gone from 
very restrictive to restrictive (at best). Interestingly, the CJEU adopts a 
pragmatic approach to sex equality rulings, and balances it from case to 
case. Therefore, the starting point for this analysis in this part of the pa-
per is to consider how the Court ruled on positive action in the past and 
how these decisions reflect the development of gender equality legisla-
tion in favour of positive action enforcement. The authors will then try to 
answer whether the CJEU could consider the gender-balance directive a 
violation of the principle of equality between men and women.
The old article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 stipulates: ‘This Directive 
shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for 
men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which 
affect women’s opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)’. The 
CJEU’s case law relating to article 2(4) of the above-mentioned Directives 
includes: Commission v France; Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen; Mar-
schall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen; Badeck v Landesan beim Staatsger-
ichtshof des Landes Hessen; Abrahamsson v Fogelqvist; Lommers v Min-
ister Van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij; Briheche; Von Colson and 
Kamman. These cases will be briefly considered below. 
27 Commission, ‘Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the European Union, 2013 
(2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_balance_decision_mak-
ing/131011_women_men_leadership_en.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018 
28 Commission (n 5). 
29 ibid 19.
30 ibid 23. 
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The first CJEU judgement on positive action was not so ‘positive’ 
for women. In 1988, in Commission v France,31 the Court had the first 
chance to interpret the gender ‘positive action’ clause of the then Direc-
tive 76/207/EEC on Equal Treatment for Men and Women.32 The Court 
concluded that: 
The exception provided for in [the positive action clause of the Di-
rective] is specifically and exclusively designed to allow measures 
which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended 
to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist 
in the reality of social life. Nothing in the papers of the case, how-
ever, makes it possible to conclude that a generalized preservation 
of special rights for women in collective agreements may correspond 
to the situation envisaged in that provision.33 
By starting the saga on ‘no to automatic preferences for women’, in 
the controversial Kalanke34 ruling, the CJEU stated that ‘national laws 
which guarantee women absolute and unconditional priority for appoint-
ments or promotion in sectors in which they are under‐represented go 
beyond the limits of the exception provided by art 2(4)’. Advocate General 
Tesauro, in his opinion in Kalanke, interprets gender-specific measures 
necessary to achieve real and effective substantive equality (not as a ‘gen-
uine derogation’ from the principle of equal treatment).35 Actually, Tesau-
ro emphasised that article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 addressed equality of 
opportunities, not outcomes. However, the CJEU left unanswered what 
equality of opportunity is and how ‘proportional’ a sex-related preference 
must be. In Kalanke, the CJEU decided in abstracto, leaving the final 
decision to the national court which applies the law to the facts of the 
case. Interestingly, reaction to this case (no to ‘automatic preferences’) 
provoked a change in 1997 to the founding treaties in order to impose 
‘positive action’ measures in favour of women. Later, the CJEU accepted 
certain preferences in favour of women, but still under rather strict con-
ditions.  
A month after the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, but before its en-
try into force in 1999, the Court started to refine and develop its case 
31 Case C-312/86 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1988:485. 
32 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40. In 2006, this Directive was replaced 
by Directive 2006/54/EC on equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment 
and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23.
33 Commission v France (n 31) paras 14 and 15.
34 Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen ECLI:EU:C:1995:322.
35 Case C-450/93 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen ECLI:EU:C:1995:105, 
Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 15.
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law on positive action – without ever acknowledging any influence of the 
new Treaty provision. Namely, the CJEU still refers to positive action 
as a derogation from the principle of equality, not as a rule having the 
objective of ‘ensuring full equality in practice’ as it is mentioned in the 
new Treaty provision on positive action. Gradually, the clear rule spelled 
out in Kalanke became more flexible, even if it was not completely aban-
doned. In November 1997 in its Marschall36 ruling, the CJEU confirmed 
there was no automatic preference in cases of the under-represented sex 
but it softened its position (yes, but provided certain circumstances were 
fulfilled) by ruling:
A national rule which, in a case where there are fewer women than 
men at the level of the relevant post in a sector of the public service 
and both female and male candidates for the post are equally quali-
fied in terms of their suitability, competence and professional per-
formance, requires that priority be given to the promotion of female 
candidates unless reasons specific to an individual male candidate 
tilt the balance in his favour is not precluded by Article 2(1) and 
(4) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 provided 
that: a. In each individual case the rule provides for male candidates 
who are equally as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee 
that the candidatures will be the subject of an objective assessment 
which will take account of all criteria specific to the candidates and 
will override the priority accorded to female candidates where one 
or more of those criteria tilts the balance in favour of the male can-
didate, and b. Such criteria are not such as to discriminate against 
the female candidates. 
Although in Marschall and Kalanke the facts were almost identical, 
in Marschall the CJEU overturned the result of its decision in Kalanke 
without overruling it.
In Badeck,37 the CJEU reinforced the less restrictive approach and 
confirmed and developed its decision in Marschall, and it was quite clear 
that a positive action measure in favour of women was compatible with 
EU law where it does not unconditionally and automatically give priority 
to women and where candidatures are the subject of objective assess-
ment, which takes account of the specific personal situation of all can-
didates. The CJEU’s argumentation also widened the scope of the appli-
cability of positive action measures.38 However, it remains unclear what 
counts as qualifications and who defines the qualifications. 
36 Case C-409/95 Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen ECLI:EU:C:1997:533.
37 Case C-158/97 Georg Badeck and Others ECLI:EU:C:2000:163.
38 NE Ramos Martin, ‘Positive Action in EU Gender Equality Law: Promoting Women in 
Corporate Decision-Making Positions’ (2014) 3(1) Spanish Labour Law and Employment 
Relations Journal 20, 28. 
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In Abrahamsson,39 the CJEU stated that article 2(1) and (4) and ar-
ticle 141(4) EC preclude 
national legislation under which a candidate for a public post who 
belongs to the under‐represented sex and possesses sufficient quali-
fications for that post must be chosen in preference to a candidate of 
the opposite sex who would otherwise have been appointed, where 
this is necessary to secure the appointment of a candidate of the un-
der‐represented sex and the difference between the respective merits 
of the candidates is not so great as to give rise to a breach of the 
requirement of objectivity in making appointments. 
Both Marschall and Abrahamsson, CJEU clearly emphasised that 
national legislation providing for positive action to counter women’s dis-
advantages in professional posts is only in line with the equal treatment 
principle if the criterion of equal qualifications is met. 
In Lommers,40 the CJEU gave new light to the interpretation of posi-
tive action measures and held that derogations from the equal treatment 
principle must be interpreted ‘proportionately’ (as opposed to ‘restric-
tively’ as in its ruling in Kalanke). 
In Briheche,41 the CJEU extended the scope for lawful positive ac-
tion. Article 3(1) and article 2(4) must be interpreted as meaning that 
39 ‘Article 2(1) and (4) of Directive 76/207 and Article 141(4) EC also preclude national 
legislation of that kind where it applies only to procedures for filling a predetermined num-
ber of posts or to posts created as part of a specific programme of a particular higher edu-
cational institution allowing the application of positive discrimination measures. Art 2(1) 
and (4) of Directive 76/207 does not preclude a rule of national case law under which a 
candidate belonging to the under-represented sex may be granted preference over a com-
petitor of the opposite sex, provided that the candidates possess equivalent or substantially 
equivalent merits, where the candidatures are subjected to an objective assessment which 
takes account of the specific personal situations of all the candidates. The question whether 
national rules providing for positive discrimination in the making of appointments in higher 
education are lawful cannot depend on the level of the post to be filled.’ Case C-407/98 
Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist ECLI:EU:C:2000:367.
40 ‘Article 2(1) and (4) does not preclude a scheme set up by a Minister to tackle extensive 
under‐representation of women within his Ministry under which, in a context characterised 
by a proven insufficiency of proper, affordable care facilities, a limited number of subsidised 
nursery places made available by the Ministry to its staff is reserved for female officials alone 
whilst male officials may have access to them only in cases of emergency, to be determined 
by the employer. That is so, however, only in so far, in particular, as the said exception in 
favour of male officials is construed as allowing those of them who take care of their chil-
dren by themselves to have access to that nursery places scheme on the same conditions 
as female officials.’ Case C-476/99 H Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Visserij ECLI:EU:C:2002:183.
41 ‘As the Commission has correctly pointed out, such a provision automatically and uncon-
ditionally gives priority to the candidatures of certain categories of women, including widows 
who have not remarried who are obliged to work, reserving to them the benefit of the exemp-
tion from the age limit for obtaining access to public ‐ sector employment and excluding 
widowers who have not remarried who are in the same situation’ (para 27). Case C-319/03 
Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la 
Justice ECLI:EU:C:2004:398.
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they preclude a national provision, such as that in question in the main 
proceedings, which reserves the exemption from the age limit for obtain-
ing access to public sector employment to widows who have not remar-
ried and who are obliged to work, excluding widowers who have not re-
married who are in the same situation. 
The CJEU has also developed criteria to assess the legality of posi-
tive action measures: they must be based on clear unambiguous criteria, 
address specific career inequalities and help the under-represented sex 
to conduct their life on a more equal footing with the other sex. The Com-
mission’s factsheet outlines the requirements stated in the case law: 
1) The measures must concern a sector in which women are under-
represented (Kalanke case, C-450/93); 2) They can only give pri-
ority to equally qualified female candidates over male candidates 
(Abrahamsson case, C-407-98); 3) They must not give automatic 
and unconditional priority to equally qualified candidates of the 
under-represented sex, but must include the possibility of grant-
ing exceptions in justified cases which take into account the indi-
vidual situation, notably the personal situation of each candidate 
(Marschall case, C-409/95).42
O’Cinneide claims that: 
This case-law thus continues to cause some difficulties. The CJEU 
has not yet clarified what exactly constitutes giving automatic pref-
erence to women. This means that the position of the CJEU on posi-
tive action remains ambiguous and uncertain. This lack of clarity 
may at times discourage the use of certain forms of positive action in 
Member States, as governments can be reluctant to risk a negative 
decision by the CJEU.43
It is difficult to foresee whether the CJEU will adopt similar legal rea-
soning to positive action for other grounds of discrimination or positive 
action in areas beyond employment. As Caruso claims:
a close analysis of the CJEU’s decisions on positive action in fa-
vour of women casts serious doubt on the wisdom of extending that 
court’s equality paradigm to matters of race, ethnicity, or religion … 
[A]nchored as it is to a rigidly individualistic conception of rights, 
the Court lacks both conceptual and institutional tools to embrace 
complex issues of collective justice in diverse societies.44
42 Commission (n 3) (emphasis in the original).
43 C O’Cinneide, ‘Positive Action’ (2014) ERA, Academy of European Law 18.
44 D Caruso, ‘Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union after 
the New Equality Directives’ (2003) Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series, 
Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No 03-21, 3. 
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Advocating for a better doctrinal model for judicial evaluation of 
positive action might be a logical step forward but might also be too am-
bitious. In the application of positive action at national level, there is a 
need for intensive dialogue between the CJEU and national courts. Im-
plementation of sex equality legislation requires appropriate and effective 
sanctions. In its Von Colson and Kamman ruling,45 the CJEU concludes 
the following: 
although Directive No 76/207/EEC, for the purpose of imposing 
sanctions for the breach of the prohibition of discrimination, leaves 
the Member States free to choose between the different solutions 
suitable for achieving its objective, it nevertheless requires that if a 
Member State chooses to penalise breaches of that prohibition by 
the award of compensation, then in order to ensure that it is effec-
tive and that it has a deterrent effect, that compensation must in 
any event be adequate in relation to the damage sustained and must 
therefore amount to more than purely nominal compensation such 
as, for instance, the reimbursement only of the expenses incurred in 
connection with the application. It is for the national court to inter-
pret and apply the legislation adopted for the implementation of the 
directive in conformity with the requirements of community law, in 
so far as it is given discretion to do so under national law. 
4 Proposal: the first crack in the glass ceiling?
The European Commission proposed the Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among 
non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and re-
lated measures on 14 November 2012. ‘On November 20th, 2013, the pro-
posal passed through the first reading in the European Parliament’.46 Af-
terwards, the Economic and Social Committee and Committee of Regions 
discussed the proposal, and it was adopted by the European Parliament 
at its first reading.47 The next step was for the directive to be adopted 
by the Council at the first reading, as part of the legislative procedure.48 
However, the voting process in the Council took some time, as the Coun-
cil did not agree with the first reading of the Parliament. Member States 
have had opposing opinions on the proposal, mostly due to the principle 
45 Case C-14/83 Von Colson and Kamman ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, para 22.
46 The Women-on-Boards Directive in the Council’ (EWSDGE, 16 December 2014) <www.
ewsdge.eu/the-women-on-boards-directive-in-the-council/> accessed 3 January 2018.
47 European Parliament, ‘Gender Balance on Boards’ (Legislative Train Schedule, Area of 
Justice and Fundamental Rights) <www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-
of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-gender-balance-on-boards> accessed 3 January 
2018.
48 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (n 11).
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of subsidiarity. On 11 December 2014, the Proposal for the Women on 
Company Boards Directive was discussed. According to an official press 
release, the Council ‘was not able to reach a general approach’. One year 
later, in December 2014, the Council rejected the proposal. It explained 
the rejection by reason of not reaching an agreement. In the final deci-
sion, it invited the preparatory bodies to ‘fix’ the file and continue work 
on it to try to find a compromise. After significant time spent on finalising 
the proposal, a progress report was filed on 11 June 2015 in which it was 
explained that the problem would remain unsolved because there was no 
consensus about the regulation. Some Member States preferred national 
or non-binding measures, and some preferred EU legislation. Therefore, 
the proposal has been halted until today due to a lack of political will, 
although it seems there was overall support for the ‘adoption of the 2012 
proposal for a Directive on improving the gender balance among non-
executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges by 2016’.49
The problem of boards with a gender imbalance clearly exists and it 
needs to be fixed by a binding, stable form of legislation, because the pop-
ulation of women has always been under-represented there.50 Progress 
in increasing the presence of women on company boards has been very 
slow, with an average annual increase in the past few years of just 0.6 
percentage points per year.51 ‘Company boards in the EU are character-
ised by persistent gender imbalances, as evidenced by the fact that only 
13.7% of corporate seats in the largest listed companies are currently 
held by women (15% among non-executive directors)’. With this in mind, 
it is clear why the Commission tried to encourage ‘the private sector to 
increase the presence of women at all levels of decision-making, notably 
by positive action programmes, and called upon the Commission to take 
steps to achieve balanced gender participation in this regard’. Trends in 
national legislation such as quotas were also used as an example which 
led to the proposal itself.52 The European Commission proposed the Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the 
gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on 
stock exchanges and related measures on 14 November 2012. 
49 European Commission, ‘Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019’ (Directo-
rate-General for Justice and Consumers 2015).
50 Z Krečkova  ‘Women on Boards: The Perspective of Czech and Slovak Republics within 
the European Context’  (2013) 1 (1) Management: Science and Education 40 <www.infoma.
fri.uniza.sk/archive/mse/v2n1/040-042.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018.
51 V Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner ‘Map-
ping EU Action on Gender Equality: From the Treaty of Rome to Quotas’ (speech to Harvard 
Club Belgium/Brussels, 8 October 2012).
52 O Alvaro and M Gondek, ‘Women on Company Boards: An Example of Positive Action in 
Europe’ (2014) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No RSCAS 
2014/34
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32251/RSCAS%202014_34 pdf?sequence> 
accessed 3 January 2018.
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The ratio of this proposal was the attempt to exert direct influence 
on this area of interest: ‘Member States and the EU institutions have 
undertaken numerous efforts during several decades to promote gender 
equality in economic decision-making, notably to enhance female pres-
ence in company boards, by adopting recommendations and encouraging 
self-regulation’.53 Finally, ‘with this proposal, the European Commission 
is answering the strong call of the European Parliament for EU action 
to bring about gender equality in corporate boardrooms. Today, we are 
asking large listed companies across Europe to show that they are seri-
ous when it comes to gender equality in economic decision-making.’54The 
proposal itself states that it ‘seeks to promote gender equality in economic 
decision-making and to fully exploit the existing talent pool of candidates 
for more equal gender representation on company boards, thereby con-
tributing to the Europe 2020 objectives. The proposed directive will lead 
to breaking down the barriers that women face when aiming for board 
positions and to improved corporate governance, as well as enhanced 
company performance’. 
Admitting the problem of the higher amount of men in corporate 
boards and not being able to solve it within the existing framework, the 
European Commission proposed the directive whose ‘goal is 30% women 
on the boards of the major European companies in 2015 and 40% by 
2020’. The substantive target of the proposal is elaborated in article 4, 
and that is that Member States either ‘aim to attain, by 31 December 
2020, the objective that members of the under‐represented sex hold at 
least 40% of non‐executive director positions’ or ‘aim to attain, by 31 De-
cember 2020, the objective that members of the under‐represented sex 
hold at least 33% of all director positions, including both executive and 
non‐executive directors’. What is more, it will aim at ‘publicly listed com-
panies, due to their economic importance and high visibility’. ‘It is in the 
interests of the business community and society as a whole for the gov-
ernance practices of publicly listed companies to be transparent’.55 Con-
sequently, ‘they set standards for the private sector at large. Moreover, 
they tend to have larger boards and have a similar legal status across the 
EU, providing the necessary comparability of situations’.56 The purpose 
53 G Mike, ‘Gender Balance or Imbalance More Women on Company Boards?’  (2013) 9(4) 
Iustum Aequum Salutare < http://ias.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20134sz/15.pdf> accessed 3 
January 2018.
54 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, as cited in Commission, 
‘Women on Boards: Commission Proposes 40% Objective’ (Press Release, 14 November 
2012).
55 European Women on Boards, ‘New Study: Progress and Challenges for Women on Com-
pany Boards’ (Press Release, 27 April 2016) <https://t.co/7CiWDmsqWO> accessed 3 Jan-
uary 2018. 
56 Mike (n 53).
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of the proposal was to tackle the most important issues regarding gen-
der equality, and it tried to set realistic targets. This directive was meant 
to help achieve gender-balanced boards and to bring down the barriers 
which caused the glass ceiling. The choice of options was left to the Mem-
ber States ‘to adjust the detailed regulation to their specific situations 
in terms of national company law and to choose the most appropriate 
means of enforcement and sanctions. It also allows individual Member 
States to go beyond the minimum standard, on a voluntary basis’.57 
Apart from the quotas, Member States have to fulfil other obligations. 
Firstly, Member States have to set individual quantitative gender balance 
objectives in areas where general regulations do not apply directly. 
Besides this, the proposal established the duty of reporting in which 
public listed companies have the obligation to report to national equal-
ity bodies. Listed companies are required to provide information on the 
gender composition of their boards to competent national authorities. 
This information should be published on the company’s website and, if 
the company in question does not meet the objective, it should include 
a description of measures the company has taken so far and intends to 
take to meet the objective in the future.
The duty to inform also includes the duty to inform candidates for 
election or appointment: 
While respecting the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, Member 
States shall ensure that, in response to a request from a candidate 
who has been considered in the selection for appointment or elec-
tion, listed companies are obliged to inform that candidate of the 
following: (a) the qualification criteria upon which the selection was 
based, (b) the objective comparative assessment of the candidates 
under those criteria, and, (c) where relevant, the considerations tilt-
ing the balance in favour of a candidate of the other sex.58
Furthermore, dealing with requests from candidates, all decisive pa-
rameters (qualification, objective comparison and considerations crucial 
for equality) need to be explained to candidates in a transparent way: 
57 R Somssich, ‘Sources of the EU Law and Decision Making Institutional Framework in 
the EU’ (Presentation at the Workshop on the Transposition of EU Legislation into the 
Legal System of Turkey, Ankara, 25 May 2016) < www.slideshare.net/SIGMA2013/reka-
somssich-sources-of-the-eu-law-and-decision-making-institutional-framework-in-the-eu-
ankara-25-may-2016> accessed 3 January 2018.
58 Council of the European Union, Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among directors of compa-
nies listed on stock exchanges and related measures 16300 (2014) art 4a, para 3
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016300%202014%20INIT> 
accessed 17 January 2018.
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In the selection of candidates for appointment or election to the po-
sitions referred to in Article 4(1), Member States shall ensure that, 
when choosing between candidates who are equally qualified in 
terms of suitability, competence and professional performance, pri-
ority shall be given to the candidate of the under‐represented sex, 
unless an objective assessment taking account of all criteria specific 
to the individual candidates tilts the balance in favour of the candi-
date of the other sex.59  
If the candidate of the under-represented sex affirms a prima facie 
instance of discrimination, the burden of proof will shift to the respond-
ent company. 
In addition, a new procedural obligation switches the burden of proof 
on listed companies in the case of the non-employment of a candidate of 
the under-represented sex, which has to be incorporated in judicial sys-
tems of all Member States: 
Member States shall take the necessary measures, in accordance 
with their national judicial systems, to ensure that where a candi-
date of the under‐represented sex establishes facts from which it 
may be presumed that he or she was equally qualified as compares 
with the candidate of the other sex selected for appointment or elec-
tion, it shall be for the listed company to prove that there has been 
no breach of Article 4a(2).60
As far as sanctions go, they can be considered as a weak instru-
ment for the fulfilment of the obligations set by the directive. Sanctions 
are of three main types: annual reports, procedural requirements, and 
individual quantitative objectives. Companies should report annually on 
the progress made. The main criterion for a position on the board should 
be qualifications, on account of the obligation to set objective criteria of 
qualifications in order to prevent promotion that is mainly based on sex. 
According to the CJEU case law on positive action, preference is given to 
a member of the under-represented sex who has equal qualifications if 
the objective criteria do not go in favour of the other candidate. 
Nevertheless, non-compliance with the directive is not penalised. 
‘This Article obliges Member States to lay down rules on sanctions appli-
cable in case of breach of this Directive. These sanctions must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. A non-exhaustive list of possible concrete 
measures is set out’.61 The only ‘sanction’ is the obligation of companies 
to explain the reasons for not meeting the criteria and a description of the 
59 Council (n 58) art 4a, para 2.
60 Council (n 58) art 4a, para 3. 
61 Commission (n 12).  
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measures which have already been taken or an outline of the plans to 
take them.62
Considering the existing sanctions, more severe enforcement meas-
ures could be imposed respecting the limits of proportionality, which 
does not let failure to respect the numerical goals go unpunished. Pun-
ishment should be in the form of fiscal incentives or penalties under the 
area of public procurement. These types of sanctions would have great 
economic effects on publicly listed companies, as they are led by profit 
and economic reasoning. One of the aims of the proposal is assuredly 
the flexibility clause. Contrary to its purpose, allowing the more proac-
tive Member States to develop their own policy to promote equality pro-
grammes without clashing with the substance of the proposal permits 
very wide interpretation in national legislation and makes room for tailor-
made gender-diversity strategies. Although subsidiarity is very important 
in EU law, it should not affect the efficiency of the provision as in this 
case. However, due to subsidiarity and weak sanctions, this proposal 
was not implemented and even if it had been it would have had quite a 
weak impact on gender equality on boards due to the weak enforcement 
instruments it imposes.
An interesting aspect of this directive is also the ability of Member 
States to exert their discretion, because certain MSs which have already 
made positive measures to ensure more balanced representation of both 
sexes among the directors of listed companies following the objectives 
set out in article 4(1), or have progressed not far from the objectives, can 
decide to suspend the application of article 4a. If they decide to use their 
right to do so, the objectives set out in article 4(1) will be considered to 
be fulfilled.
After analysing the obligations laid down by the proposal and the 
lack of sanctions, it is quite clear that enforcement measures have to 
be introduced. Firstly, Member States have to come up with rules on 
enforcement measures which can be applied to infringements of the na-
tional provisions adopted pursuant to articles 4 and 5 of the directive as 
applicable and must take all necessary measures to ensure that they are 
applied. Secondly, the enforcement measures have to be effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive. Finally, listed companies can be held liable 
only for the acts which may be connected to them by national law.
Due to its obligation and sanctions, this directive was often criticised 
because ‘it does not impose an obligation to guarantee a certain result, but 
an obligation to put in one’s best efforts to take the necessary measures 
62 European Women Shareholders Demand Gender Equality, ‘The Women-on-Boards Di-
rective in the Council’ (16 December 2014) <www.ewsdge.eu/the-women-on-boards-direc-
tive-in-the-council/> accessed 3 January 2018. 
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that can contribute to achieving the objective’.63 It was also criticised 
because of its economic, and not altruistic, motives.64 On the one hand, 
this directive ‘does not constitute an appropriate legal solution for this 
problem’ because of the lack of sanctions and weak obligations. On the 
other hand, it is unanimously held that ‘failing to reach agreement on the 
proposal would mean missing an opportunity to achieve any progress at 
all in the near future in a significant number of Member States’.65
Another question which must be asked related to this directive is if it 
goes far enough. The proposal addresses the serious problem of women’s 
under-representation in economic decision-making positions, setting a 
goal of a 40% threshold of women among non-executive directors/su-
pervisory board members by 2020 for private listed companies. The pro-
posal for the directive ‘seeks to achieve a more balanced representation of 
men and women among the directors of listed companies by establishing 
measures aimed at accelerated progress’. Why 40%? 
The proposed objective of 40% for the minimum share of both sexes 
is in line with the targets currently under discussion and set out in 
several EU Member States/EEA countries. This figure is situated 
between the minimum of the ‘critical mass’ of 30%, which has been 
found necessary to have a sustainable impact on board performance 
and full gender parity (50%).66 
Why only non-executive boards? 
Non-executive or supervisory directors are recruited by companies 
for a variety of purposes. Of particular importance is their role in 
overseeing executive or managing directors and dealing with situ-
ations involving conflicts of interests. It is vital to foster that role 
in order to restore confidence in financial markets. Member States 
should therefore be invited to adopt measures which would be ap-
plicable to listed companies, defined as companies whose securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the Community.67 
63 L Senden and M Visser, ‘Balancing a Tightrope: The EU Directive on Improving the 
Gender Balance among Non-executive Directors of Boards of Listed Companies’ (2013) 1 
European Gender Equality Law Review 
<http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/287052/Senden+-+Balancing+a+ 
Tightrope+-+The+EU+Directive.pdf?sequence=1>accessed 3 January 2018.
64 M Szydło, ‘Constitutional Values Underlying Gender Equality on the Boards of Compa-
nies: How Should the EU Put These Values into Practice?’ (2014)  63(1) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 
<www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view S002058931300050X> 
accessed 3 January 2018.
65 Senden and Visser (n 64).  
66 Commission (n 12) (Purpose of the proposal).
67 Commission, Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or 
supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board 
[2005) ] OJ L 52/51
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The main goal is to promote gender-diversity in companies’ boards, 
and with that gender-diversity in decision-making, and thus enabling 
women to participate: 
Minimum harmonization as regards both a requirement for listed 
companies to take appointment decisions on the basis of an objec-
tive comparative assessment of the qualifications of candidates and 
the setting of a quantitative objective for the gender balance among 
non-executives directors seems essential to ensure a competitive 
playing field and to avoid practical complications for listed compa-
nies in the internal market.68
The proposal has quite a restricted scope of application, because it 
targets publicly listed companies which have their registered office in one 
of the Member States and excludes small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Moreover, publicly listed companies usually have larger boards and a 
similar legal status and way of functioning across the EU, providing for 
necessary similarity between situations. Small and medium-sized enter-
prises with fewer than 250 employees and an annual profit that does 
not exceed EUR 50 million are excluded from the scope even if they are 
publicly listed.69 The proposal can be applied only to publicly listed and 
EU-registered companies in the European Union. There are 7,500 such 
companies in the EU, 2,500 of which are SMEs.70 Consequently, this 
means that the legislative proposal is likely to affect a total of about 5,000 
companies. Consequently, it is quite clear that the proposal does not go 
far enough. Taking the weak obligations and even weaker sanctions, and 
the flexibility and discretion of Member States into consideration, it is 
clear that from a formal/procedural point of view it fails to set a positive 
example for gender-balanced boards. 
Analysing the subjects of its measures, the directive cannot be treat-
ed as a positive measure and a revolution in economic decision-making 
for the under-represented sex. For all these reasons, the nature of the 
directive also becomes quite fragile. Can it be considered hard law tak-
ing into account its various weak impacts given the non-binding form of 
the proposed positive action? On the one hand, the legislative procedure 
behind the directive, alongside the direct effect that it has on the Member 
States, can make it seem a hard law instrument. On the other hand, with 
the sunset clause, the discretion of Member States and its weak sanctions 
68 Commission (n 12) Policy context. 
69 Commission, ‘The New SME Definition: User Guide and Model Declaration’ (Enterprise 
and Industry Publications) <www.eusmecentre.org.cn/sites/default/files/files/news/
SME%20Definition.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018.
70 Commission, ‘Gender Balance on Boards (National Factsheet - Country: United King-
dom, 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/wome-
nonboards-factsheet-uk_en.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018.
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and obligations, the proposal can be treated as a soft law instrument, 
which would explain the indifference of the EU towards this directive.
Nevertheless, considering the rich history of CJEU case law and the 
legislative background that forms the legal base for the directive, it is no-
ticeable that the directive is the only solution for gender-balanced boards. 
In the scope of legal standards incorporated in the case law, it is clear 
that the directive comes as a result of them and that it fulfils the require-
ments of the CJEU case law. It is especially obvious in one of proposals’ 
obligation, where the legislative influence of the EU was broadened by 
allowing the Member States to make their own objective criteria for the 
under-represented sex. This idea was based on the Kalanke case, where 
the Court said that ‘national laws which guarantee women absolute and 
unconditional priority for appointments or promotion in sectors in which 
they are under-represented go beyond the limits of the exception pro-
vided by art 2(4)’. Furthermore, another obligation in the directive is to 
give priority to the candidate of the under-represented sex, unless some 
crucial objective criteria specific to the individuals go in favour of the 
other candidates, which is the result of the Courts’ opinion in Marschall: 
A national rule which, in a case where there are fewer women than 
men at the level of the relevant post in a sector of the public service 
and both female and male candidates for the post are equally quali-
fied in terms of their suitability, competence and professional per-
formance, requires that priority be given to the promotion of female 
candidates unless reasons specific to an individual male candidate 
tilt the balance in his favour is not precluded.71
Further, the directive sets rules which predict objective standards 
as criteria for the under-represented sex in comparative situations, as 
stated by the CJEU in Badeck: 
in sectors of the public service where women are under-represent-
ed, [priority is given], where male and female candidates have equal 
qualifications, to female candidates where that proves necessary for 
ensuring compliance with the objectives of the women’s advance-
ment plan, if no reasons of greater legal weight are opposed, provid-
ed that that rule guarantees that candidatures are the subject of an 
objective assessment which takes account of the specific personal 
situations of all candidates.72
The directive also confirms the Courts’ opinion in Abrahamsson by 
favouring the candidates of the under-represented sex where there are 
not so many objective differences between candidates: 
71 Marschall (n 36).
72 Badeck (n 37).
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national legislation under which a candidate for a public post who 
belongs to the under-represented sex and possesses sufficient quali-
fications for that post must be chosen in preference to a candidate of 
the opposite sex who would otherwise have been appointed, where 
this is necessary to secure the appointment of a candidate of the 
under-represented sex and the difference between the respective 
merits of the candidates is not so great as to give rise to a breach of 
the requirement of objectivity in making appointments.73
Thus, it is clear that the directive follows the goals of positive action 
measures and is therefore a vital source of law for gender equality in cor-
porate boards. 
Despite the obvious resemblance of the directive to the already pre-
sented legal standards in the scope of CJEU case law, the question arises 
whether the CJEU itself could consider the directive as a violation of the 
principle of equality between men and women: 
According to Community case law, both the principle of equality and 
the prohibition of discrimination require that, save where there is 
an objective justification, comparable situations must not be treated 
differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same 
way.74 
The CJEU could consider the directive a violation of the principle 
of equality between men and women, due to its different treatment of 
comparable situations. The principle of equality is directly linked to the 
prohibition of discrimination and the different treatment of the same 
situations. It is considered that all groups are treated equally, but in 
situations where this is not the case, the CJEU can test the compatibility 
of the provision (in this case the Women on Boards Directive) with the 
principles of the EU (in this case, the principle of equality). Moreover, if 
the CJEU compares the rules set by the directive through the propor-
tionality test, it might be established that there is an objective justifica-
tion for candidates not to be treated in the same way (why priority is 
given to the under-represented sex) and there must be a comparable 
situation (the same work experience, education, etc) to remain outside 
the domain of discrimination based on sex. Another factor that speaks in 
favour of the directive and its compatibility with the principle of equality 
in the scope of EU law is the fact that the directive is a positive action 
measure set by the EU, and by its very nature it aims to give preference 
73 Case C-407/98 Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:367.
74 C McCrudden and S Prechal, ‘The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Eu-
rope: A Practical Approach’  (European Commission, European Network of Legal Experts in 
the Field of Gender Equality, 2009).
50 Snježana Vasiljević and Ana-Maria Sunko: EU Law and Gender-Balanced Boards
to a certain under-represented group by setting hard quotas to ensure 
equal participation. Thus, the directive cannot be treated as a violation of 
the principle of equality despite different treatment of subjects in a com-
parable situation due to its justification (by applying the proportionality 
test) and its nature (a new step of EU positive action). 
However, the voting process in the Council will take some time, as 
the Council will most probably not agree with the first reading of the Par-
liament. EU Member States have different conflicting views regarding the 
proposal for the directive. Some Member States criticise the proposal for 
not complying with the principle of subsidiarity. In an attempt to reach 
a compromise between the Member States, the Italian presidency of the 
Council introduced a broad flexibility clause (article 4b) and extended the 
deadlines for implementation and reporting (articles 5, 8 and 9). Never-
theless, it seems that not all is lost. According to recent information, ‘EU 
Commissioner Jourová outlines her position on gender quotas and the 
business case for more women on boards. She has given a strong hint 
that the EU Directive is still on the table. She called on businesses to 
take action even though the directive is ‘pending’.75 Thus, perhaps it is 
still possible for the EU to provide a unified source of law to regulate and 
create gender-balanced boards.
5 Conclusion 
This paper has analysed through critical lenses the existing con-
cept of positive action. The EU gender equality legislation is rich but 
lacks a comprehensive legislative framework to improve the participa-
tion of women in decision-making structures. At the level of Member 
States, there is lack of monitoring mechanisms of positive action im-
plementation. This has led to positive action never achieving the results 
of substantive equality. Drawing on an analysis of the CJEU’s case law 
on  equality between men and women, it has been necessary for certain 
concepts defined by equality directives to be crystallised in practice. Posi-
tive action is a concept which looks perfect on paper but has never been 
completely implemented in practice. The problem with positive measures 
is the selective use of criteria which may ultimately produce even more 
inequalities. There is also a need to provide clear guidelines to promote 
positive action. Interestingly, the CJEU’s case law does not lead to the 
clarifying circumstances necessary for the application of positive action. 
For instance, the CJEU has not yet clarified what exactly constitutes giv-
ing automatic preference to women. This means that the position of the 
75 ‘Commissioner Jourová – Women on Boards Directive “Pending”’ (Equality Strategies, 
7 September 2016) <www.equalitystrategies.ie/blog/2016/09/07/commissioner-jourova-
women-on-boards-directive-pen/> accessed 3 January 2018.
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CJEU on positive action remains ambiguous and uncertain. How far the 
national courts have actually implemented the ‘guidelines’ put in practice 
by the CJEU is an area that is generally inadequately investigated. 
The proposal for the directive is a form of positive measures lying 
within the scope of EU competences supported by a rich legal base. The 
ratio of this proposal was an attempt to exert direct influence on the 
under-representation of women on boards. The directive itself sets the 
goals in the form of quotas (ie 30% women on boards in 2015 and 40% by 
2020) which would affect large public listed companies. It has imposed 
many obligations (the duty of reporting, the duty to inform candidates 
for election or appointment, priority given to a candidate of the under-
represented sex, shifting the burden of proof) which go alongside the 
rich CJEU case-law standards and requirements. The proposal has weak 
sanctions, such as annual reports, procedural requirements, and indi-
vidual quantitative objectives. More severe enforcement measures could 
be imposed respecting the limits of proportionality, for example fiscal 
incentives or penalties under the area of public procurement. This has 
also raised many questions and controversies about the hard or soft law 
nature of the directive. 
However, the directive can still be considered a hard law instrument 
due to the legislative procedure behind the directive, alongside the direct 
effect that it has on the Member States. The directive is also quite frag-
ile, but considering the rich history of CJEU case law and the legislative 
background that forms its legal base, it can be seen that the directive is 
the only solution for gender-balanced boards. In the scope of legal stand-
ards incorporated in the case law, it is clear that the directive comes as a 
result of them and that it fulfils the requirements of the CJEU case law. 
Taking all this into account, the directive would be a perfect form of posi-
tive action to tackle the specific issue of gender-balanced boards and to 
make equality effective.
